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Public Lands Council v. Babbitt: Herding Ranchers 
Off Public Land? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ranching is the backbone of many rural communities through-
out the West and an occupation and way of life for many families. 
Ranchers, who have often run livestock in the same area for decades, 
depend on public rangeland for grazing.1 
Ranchers have grazed their livestock on public land since the 
1800s.2 During the infancy of the ranching industry, any rancher 
could graze his livestock on any part of the public land. The enact-
ment of the Taylor Grazing Act (“TGA”) in 1934 began the regula-
tion of grazing on public land by allowing individual ranchers to ob-
tain a permit for exclusive grazing on a portion of the federal range. 
Under the TGA, ranchers who needed public rangeland in order to 
make use of private property were to be given grazing permits before 
ranchers who did not have private property. Adjudications were done 
to determine how many animals each rancher could graze on public 
land. 
Today there are about 177 million acres of federally owned 
rangeland controlled by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)3 
on which ranchers can graze their livestock, if they hold a grazing 
permit issued by the BLM. Without the federal grazing permits, 
many ranchers would not have a place to graze their livestock and 
could no longer ranch.4 In addition, ranchers depend on loans se-
cured by grazing permits to finance their operations.5 Because of 
their dependence on the federal rangeland, ranchers, lenders, and  
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Hannah Wolfson, Ranchers Gain a Hearing in Top Court on Grazing 
Rights, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 14, 1999, at A8. 
 2. See generally Bruce M. Pendery, Reforming Livestock Grazing on the Public Domain: 
Ecosystem Management-Based Standards and Guidelines Blaze a New Path for Range Manage-
ment, 27 ENVTL. L. 513 (1997). 
 3. See id. at 522 (citing BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1991, at 6 (1992)). 
 4. See Wolfson, supra note 1, at A8. 
 5. See infra notes 153-70 and accompanying text. 
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entire rural communities want assurance that the range will be avail-
able for grazing in the same way it has been in the past.6 
On the other hand, environmental groups, arguing that grazing 
is causing environmental damage, want livestock removed from pub-
lic land or at least reduced.7 In 1995, the Secretary of the Interior 
promulgated new regulations that substantially decreased the value 
and stability of current BLM grazing permits.8 These changes leave 
ranchers feeling like they are being herded off public land. 
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Public 
Lands Council v. Babbitt,9 which investigated the Secretary of the In-
terior’s power to instigate rangeland reform through new regulation. 
In Public Lands Council, the Court upheld the Secretary’s decision 
to alter the way that grazing permits will be issued. 
The 1995 regulations replaced the term “grazing preference” 
with the term “permitted use.”10 Grazing preference, which was de-
termined by the adjudication process, provided a constant maximum 
number of animals that could be grazed under a grazing permit, as-
suming ideal range conditions. Following the enactment of the 
TGA, the Department of the Interior engaged in a lengthy adjudica-
tion process to determine the “grazing preference” for each rancher. 
The adjudication process focused on the amount of public forage 
that ranchers would need to make use of their private property. On 
the other hand, “permitted use,” which will be determined through 
land use planning, will change the number of animals grazed from 
year to year with no constant maximum number of animals allowed 
under the grazing permit.11 Under “permitted use” there is no con-
stant maximum number of animals that can be grazed given ideal 
range conditions. The new regulations completely ignore the adjudi-
cation process and, instead, provide that the Secretary of the Interior 
(“the Secretary”) will decide ranchers’ grazing privileges with  
 
 
 6. See Clint Peck, Ranging the West: There Are Broader Issues, WESTERN FARMER-
STOCKMAN, Dec. 1997, at WB4. 
 7. See, e.g., LYNN JACOBS, WASTE OF THE WEST: PUBLIC LANDS RANCHING (1992); 
Edward Abby, Even the Bad Guys Wear White Hats, HARPER’S, Jan. 1986, at 51, 51-55. 
 8. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4100.0-4170.2 (1995). 
 9. ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 1815 (2000). 
 10. Compare 43 C.F.R. §§ 4110.2–2, 4110.3–2 (1994), with 43 C.F.R. §§ 4110.2–2, 
4110.3–2 (1995). 
 11. The distinction between “grazing preference” and “permitted use” is more fully 
discussed infra Part II.C. 
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reference only to land use plans, considering recreation, conserva-
tion, and other interests.12 
Although the Secretary maintains that the change is purely se-
mantic, the change violates the TGA’s mandate that the Secretary 
“safeguard grazing privileges.”13 Additionally, one of the TGA’s 
purposes was to stabilize the livestock industry. The substitution of 
permitted use for grazing preference will destabilize the livestock in-
dustry by making it difficult for ranchers to predict how many ani-
mals they will be allowed to graze from year to year. The instability 
will reduce the value of a grazing permit and make it more difficult 
for ranchers to use their grazing permits as collateral for new loans. 
Furthermore, it will hurt lenders who already hold grazing permits as 
security by reducing the value of that security. 
Part II of this Note provides general background on grazing 
statutes and regulations. Part III briefly outlines the facts and hold-
ing in Public Lands Council v. Babbitt. Part IV analyzes the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning. This Note concludes that elimination of the graz-
ing preference will destabilize the livestock industry by making it dif-
ficult for ranchers to use their grazing permits as collateral. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court should have held that the regulation 
was beyond the scope of the Secretary’s authority under the TGA 
and invalidated the regulations. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Although “[d]omestic livestock have grazed rangelands in some 
parts of the southwestern United States since the 1500s, and much 
of the rest of the western United States since the 1800s,”14 the sub-
stantial growth of the livestock industry was seen mostly during the 
period of western expansion beginning with the California gold 
rush.15 As people moved west, many settled along the banks of rivers 
or near other sources of water and started grazing livestock on ad-
joining land. The livestock industry was initially very profitable. 
“Livestock associations developed in every western state, and by the 
 
 12. Public Lands Council, 120 S. Ct. at 1823. 
 13. See 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1994). 
 14. Pendery, supra note 2, at 515 (footnotes omitted). 
 15. See WAYNE HAGE, STORM OVER RANGELANDS: PRIVATE RIGHTS IN FEDERAL 
LANDS 13-15 (1994). 
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early 1880s, there were even several rival national associations.”16 
Unusually high rainfall between 1910 and 1920 contributed to good 
grazing conditions and led many ranchers to believe that they had 
found the American Dream.17 
The honeymoon period ended quickly. By the 1930s, the 
weather patterns returned to normal, and only the hearty ranchers 
survived.18 The dry weather, compounded by the Great Depression, 
increased financial pressure on ranchers.19 In an attempt to compen-
sate, many ranchers increased the size of their herds.20 Ranchers be-
gan to realize that the system of common ownership was ruining 
much of the rangeland.21 “Without controls on use [of the range-
lands], the benefits of sound [grazing] practices would not accrue to 
any one rancher. Indeed, each rancher’s incentive was to maximize 
the number of his own cattle. If each rancher followed this incentive, 
the result would be severe over-grazing.”22 
A. The Taylor Grazing Act23 
Given the tenuous economic state of the ranching industry, 
Congress felt compelled to act. In 1929, Congress created, as an ex-
periment, the Mizpah–Pumpkin Creek grazing district in southeast-
ern Montana.24 The Mizpah–Pumpkin Creek experiment gave the 
 
 16. Id. at 11. 
 17. See ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 30 (1995). 
 18. See id. at 30-31. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. at 30. Many contemporary writers have identified the pre-Taylor Grazing Act 
condition of the rangeland with Garret Hardin’s description of a “Tragedy of the Commons.” 
See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Range-
land Management II: The Commons and The Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). It is interest-
ing that Hardin suggested several methods to prevent the tragedy, including “sell[ing the graz-
ing commons] off as private property [or] keeping them as public property, but allocat[ing] 
the right to enter them.” Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
(1968). In 1934, Congress gave only limited consideration to the option of converting the 
public rangeland to private property, determining that it was “not a viable option” and instead 
adopted a regulatory scheme that would bring headaches to ranchers and government adminis-
trators for years to come. See CHRISTOPHER MCGREGORY KLYZA, WHO CONTROLS PUBLIC 
LANDS? MINING, FORESTRY, AND GRAZING POLICIES, 1870-1990, at 112 (1996). 
 23. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as amended at 43 
U.S.C. §§ 315-315(r) (1994)). 
 24. See 45 Stat. 1430 (1929). 
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Secretary supervisory power over the grazing district but allowed the 
local ranchers substantial control in the allocation of grazing rights 
and administration of the district.25 It was largely successful in im-
proving the environmental condition and carrying capacity of the 
range.26 “[S]oon applications for an extension of the system were be-
ing received from all over the West.”27 
On June 28, 1934, Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act 
(“TGA”) to regulate grazing on most non-Forest Service federal 
land.28 The TGA states, “the Secretary of the Interior is authorized, 
in his discretion, by order to establish grazing districts.”29 The Secre-
tary was further “authorized to issue . . . permits to graze livestock 
on such grazing districts.”30 Congress realized that the demand for 
grazing permits would likely be larger than the amount of domestic 
livestock that the federal rangeland could support.31 To ensure that 
ranchers who had been using the public rangeland prior to the TGA 
would still be able to graze on these lands,32 Congress provided that 
grazing permits were to be allocated with 
[p]reference . . . given . . . to those within or near a district who are 
landowners engaged in the livestock business, bona fide occupants 
or settlers, or owners of water or water rights, as may be necessary 
to permit the proper use of the lands, water or water rights owned, 
occupied, or leased by them.33 
Thus, preference was to be given to those who needed the permit to 
make use of the private land or water rights they already owned or 
leased. Finally, the TGA instructs the Secretary that “grazing privi-
 
 25. See id. 
 26. See PHILLIP O. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING 
ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 50 (1960). 
 27. E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND 
RESERVATION POLICIES 1900-50, at 215 (1972). 
 28. See Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as amended at 43 
U.S.C. §§ 315-315(r) (1994)). Prior to the TGA, the federal government had some control 
over grazing under the Forest Service Reserve Act, but the Forest Service range management 
was unpopular with many ranchers and covered only land designated as National Forests. See 
generally James L. Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239 
(1978). 
 29. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1994). 
 30. Id. § 315(b). 
 31. See H.R. REP. No. 73-903, at 1 (1934). 
 32. See 78 CONG. REC. 5372 (1934). 
 33. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b). 
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leges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately safe-
guarded.”34 
Immediately following the enactment of the TGA, the Secretary 
allocated one-year grazing licenses to ranchers.35 These licenses let 
ranchers graze their livestock temporarily—until the Secretary could 
develop regulations and adjudicate forage allotments.36 These regula-
tions came to be known as the Federal Range Code.37 The Federal 
Range Code prescribed an adjudication process that allocated forage 
in accordance with the TGA’s preference requirement.38 Thus, for-
age was first allocated to property owners in amounts sufficient to al-
low owners to make proper use of their private land and water.39 
The adjudication process was time consuming and was not com-
plete until the 1960s.40 The process itself was cumbersome. 
Each application for grazing use for each season was first consid-
ered by the advisory board. The recommendation made at the ini-
tial meeting of the board was sent to the applicant with an oppor-
tunity afforded to meet with the board at a subsequent meeting 
(protest meeting) to protest the original recommendation and offer 
new or additional information. The advisory board then made its 
final recommendation to the District Manager, who issued a deci-
sion to the applicant. The applicant was then afforded the right of 
appeal to a Hearings Examiner and a further appeal to the Direc-
tor.41 
Following the adjudication of forage, ten-year grazing permits 
were issued.42 The permits measured the number of livestock allowed 
to graze under a particular permit in animal unit months (“AUMs”).  
 
 34. Id. 
 35. See WILLIAM VOIGT, JR., PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS: USE AND MISUSE BY INDUSTRY 
AND GOVERNMENT 263 (1976). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 501.2-501.27 (Supp. 1938). 
 38. See JAMES MUHN & HANSON R. STUART, OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE: THE 
STORY OF BLM 38 (1988) (“With the creation of grazing districts, rules and regulations to 
control grazing use had to be promulgated. In granting grazing permits to ranchers, the first 
priority was to those who had adequate private land to support their herds when not using the 
public range . . . .”). 
 39. See 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1994). 
 40. See Paul Herndon, History of Grazing on the Public Lands, in THE TAYLOR 
GRAZING ACT: 50 YEARS OF PROGRESS 1, 4 (1984). 
 41. William Mathews, Management of Grazing Use, in THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT: 50 
YEARS OF PROGRESS 14, 14-15 (1984); see also FOSS, supra note 26, at 63-66. 
 42. See VOIGT, supra note 35, at 263. 
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An AUM is the amount of forage it takes to feed one cow or horse 
or five sheep or goats for one month.43 
While there were mixed verdicts on whether the TGA and the 
accompanying regulations improved the conditions of the rangeland, 
the TGA was undoubtedly successful in promoting and establishing 
rural communities in the West.44 Income from ranching fueled the 
economy in many rural areas. Lenders financed local ranching opera-
tions, and rural main streets developed to provide products and ser-
vices to the ranchers.45 
B. Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 197646and Public 
Rangelands Improvement Act of 197847 
Although there were several minor amendments to the TGA,48 
the first major changes and additions to grazing statutes came with 
 
 43. See 43 C.F.R. § 501.2(i) (“Animal-unit month. That amount of natural, cultivated, 
or complementary feed necessary for the complete subsistence of one cow for a period of one 
month. For the purpose of this definition, one horse or five goats or five sheep will be consid-
ered the equivalent of one cow.”). 
 44. See FOSS, supra note 26, at 72 (“The system has without doubt accomplished one of 
the major objectives of the Taylor Grazing Act: the stabilization of the livestock industry de-
pendent on the public range.”); Peter B. McIntyre, The Road to Rangeland Reform: A His-
tory, Review, and Prospectus (visited Nov. 26, 1999) <http://www.nets.com/fguardi-
ans/mcin-tyre/reform.htm>. 
[The TGA did] produce small, stable communities in the west based on feeding, 
supplying, and financing ranchers. Employment could be found either on a ranch or 
with a public agency addressing ranch issues, and many ranch families added genera-
tion upon generation of stockmen who managed the family ranch, including both 
the private base ranch and the public range leases. 
Id. 
 45. See 139 CONG. REC. 14,169 (1993) (statement of Sen. Campbell). 
Every western ranching job creates as many as four jobs on Main Street. If ranchers 
go under, so will the tractor, truck and automobile dealers, the gas, grocery and feed 
store owners, the veterinarians, doctors, and dentists, and many others who make up 
the commercial and social fabric of rural western towns. 
Id. 
 46. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 97-579, 90 Stat. 2743 
(1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1994, Supp. I 1995, Supp. II 1996, & 
Supp. III 1997)). 
 47. Public Rangelands Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1803 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-08 (1994)). 
 48. See, e.g., Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 842, 49 Stat. 1976 (increasing the area that 
could be included in grazing districts to forty-two million acres); Act of Aug. 6, 1947, ch. 507, 
61 Stat. 790 (allowing the Secretary to set separate grazing fees and range-improvement fees); 
Act of May 28, 1954, ch. 243, 68 Stat. 151 (eliminating the acre limit of lands that could be 
included in grazing districts). 
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the passage of the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act 
(“FLPMA”) in 1976. The enactment of FLPMA was prompted, at 
least in part, by a desire to give the BLM authority to manage its 
rangeland similar to the Forest Service’s authority to manage Forest 
Service land.49 Additionally, FLPMA was Congress’s response to 
growing public interest in the aesthetic benefits and recreational op-
portunities afforded by BLM land.50 
FLPMA provides that public lands should be managed “under 
principles of multiple use and sustained yield”51 in such a way as to 
protect “scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air 
and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.”52 
FLPMA requires a closer scrutiny of the use of BLM land by stating, 
“Land use plans shall be developed for the public lands regardless of 
whether such lands previously have been classified, withdrawn, set 
aside, or otherwise designated for one or more uses.”53 Although 
FLPMA recognizes new interests that must be weighed in the man-
agement of grazing districts, it “does not repeal the major Taylor Act 
provisions.”54 Thus, the Secretary is still statutorily required to pro-
vide for stabilization of the livestock industry when formulating 
rangeland policy. 
Even following the enactment of FLPMA, Congress was unsatis-
fied with the condition of the public rangelands.55 Consequently, 
Congress enacted the Public Rangelands Improvements Act 
(“PRIA”) in 1978.56 “PRIA . . . gave [the] BLM a substantive con-
gressional mandate: improve range condition[s].”57 With PRIA, 
Congress also implemented a new grazing fee system that it had 
 
 49. See George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: 
FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 3-4 (1983) [hereinafter Cog-
gins IV]. The BLM had been given authority to manage grazing on land covered by the TGA 
in the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, but that authority expired in 1970. See 
Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 986 (1964) (expired 1970). 
 50. See R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH 
REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 61-64 (1993). 
 51. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1994). 
 52. Id. § 1701(a)(8). 
 53. Id. § 1712(a). 
 54. Coggins IV, supra note 49, at 5 (citations omitted). 
 55. See 43 U.S.C. § 1901 (“[V]ast segments of the public rangelands are producing less 
than their potential for livestock, wildlife habitat, recreation, forage, and water and soil conser-
vation benefits, and for that reason are in an unsatisfactory condition . . . .”). 
 56. Id. §§ 1901-08. 
 57. Pendery, supra note 2, at 552. 
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been unable to agree on when FLPMA was enacted.58 Like FLPMA, 
PRIA did not repeal the TGA. Instead, PRIA provides that it should 
“be construed as supplemental to and not in derogation of the pur-
poses for which public rangelands are administered under other pro-
visions of law.”59 
The enactment of FLPMA and PRIA led to many revisions in the 
Federal Range Code.60 These changes applied to the way grazing 
permits would be assigned when additional land was available for 
grazing but did not change the AUM amounts that had been set by 
adjudication prior to the passage of FLPMA and PRIA.61 
The preamble to the 1978 amendments noted that “[s]erious con-
cern was expressed in several of the comments about how these 
grazing regulations will affect the livestock operators now author-
ized to graze on the public lands,” but asserted that “[t]heir adju-
dicated grazing use, their base properties and their areas of use (al-
lotments) will be recognized under these grazing regulations.”62 
The post-1978 adjudication process for newly available rangeland 
took into account a wider range of environmental concerns after 
FLPMA and the 1978 regulations.63 
In 1978, the Secretary, for the first time, introduced the term 
“grazing preference” (a term that was commonly used to refer to the 
adjudicated grazing privileges). The “grazing preference” was meas-
ured in AUMs and included “active use” and “suspended use.”64 
“Active use” designated the actual number of livestock that the 
rancher could graze.65 “Suspended use” was the difference between 
the grazing preference and the active use. The allocation of the graz-
ing preference between active use and suspended use could vary de-
pending upon the range conditions.66 Thus, the active use (the 
number of animals actually allowed on the range) equaled the full 
grazing preference under ideal forage conditions. While the holder of 
 
 58. See 43 U.S.C. § 1905. 
 59. Id. § 1901(c). 
 60. See McLean v. Bureau of Land Management, 133 IBLA 225, 233 (1995); see also 
Pendery, supra note 2, at 556. 
 61. See McLean, 133 IBLA at 233. 
 62. Id. (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 29,058 (1978)) (emphasis added). 
 63. See id. at 233-35. 
 64. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2–2(a) (1994). 
 65. Id. §§ 4110.2–2, 4110.3–2. 
 66. See § 4110.3–2. 
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a grazing permit was unable to utilize the part of the preference clas-
sified as suspended use during poor range conditions, the suspended 
use was valuable because it would be converted to active use if range 
conditions improved. 
C. The Permitted Use Rule 
PRIA, and the resulting regulations, were not the end of the de-
bate over grazing. President Bill Clinton made grazing reform a part 
of his agenda when he took office in 1993. He appointed Bruce 
Babbitt Secretary of the Department of Interior, and together they 
promoted recreation and conservation use of BLM land, instead of 
traditional uses like grazing and mining. Encouraged by environ-
mental groups, the Clinton administration spearheaded legislation 
that would have substantially changed grazing on public lands.67 
Western congressmen believed that the proposed grazing reform was 
“determined to drive those who earn a living on the public land into 
bankruptcy.”68 As Senator Bob Dole summarized: “Through a series 
of redefinitions and preference changes,” this legislation will “raise 
the cost of doing business for ranch families in the western 
States . . . . [C]osts will go up and some of these businesses will 
fail.”69 The legislation was ultimately defeated. 
However, the Clinton administration, and Secretary Babbitt in 
particular, has demonstrated a willingness to rely on executive rule 
making when legislative reform has been ineffective. For example, af-
ter Congress failed to pass mining reform legislation,70 Secretary 
Babbitt reinterpreted the Mining Act of 1872 by approving a Solici-
tor’s Opinion.71 The Opinion changed the way the Mining Act had 
 
 67. See H.R. 2520, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 68. 139 CONG. REC. 14,085 (1993) (statement of Sen. Campbell); see 139 CONG. 
REC. 14,090 (1993) (statement of Sen. Wallop) (“[The legislation] would have accom-
plished . . . what generations of blizzards, droughts, recessions, and disease failed to do—drive 
people off the land.”). 
 69. 139 CONG. REC. 11,654 (1993). As one commentator concluded, the “strategy was 
to place high enough hurdles in the paths of . . . cattle growers to make . . . cattle grazing on 
arid and easily damaged public lands unprofitable. Then the land could be taken out of pro-
duction, and set aside for conservation.” Carl M. Cannon, The Old-Timers, 1999 NAT’L J. 
1386, 1390. 
 70. See H.R. 322, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 257, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 71. See Memorandum from John D. Leshy, Solicitor, United States Department of the 
Interior, to Director, Bureau of Land Management, M-36988, Limitations on Patenting Mill-
sites Under the Mining Law of 1872, at 2 (Nov. 7, 1997). 
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been interpreted for 125 years.72 Another example is the creation of 
the Grand Canyon–Parashant National Monument. Although Con-
gress considered legislation designed to protect the area eventually 
included in the monument, Secretary Babbitt did not support the 
legislation because it did not ban mining in the area.73 Instead, Bab-
bitt recommended that President Clinton set aside the area as a na-
tional monument under the Antiquities Act, without congressional 
approval.74 President Clinton readily complied.75 
Similarly, Secretary Babbitt decided that he did not need new 
congressional authorization to implement the grazing policy changes 
he wanted.76 After grazing reform legislation had been defeated in 
Congress, the Department of the Interior promulgated new grazing 
regulations that were substantively very similar to some of the graz-
ing reform measures contemplated by the failed legislation.77 Under 
the previous regulations, “grazing preference” was the maximum 
number of AUMs that could be grazed given ideal range condi-
tions.78 This was the AUM amount set by the adjudication process, 
taking into account the forage necessary to make proper use of pri-
vate land and water.79 The new regulations reduced “grazing prefer-
ence” to mean “a superior or priority position against others for the 
purpose of receiving a grazing permit or lease.”80 This priority is at-
tached to “base property owned or controlled by the permittee or 
lessee.”81 As even the Secretary emphasized, “[t]he [new] definition 
[of grazing preference] omits reference to a specified quantity of for-
age, a practice that was adopted . . . during the adjudication of  
 
 
 72. See generally Patrick Garver & Mark Squillace, Mining Reform—Administrative 
Style, 45 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 14.01-14.07 (1999). 
 73. See Matt Kelley, Babbitt Wants More Land Under Federal Protection: New National 
Monuments Proposed In Arizona and Along California Coast, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 
15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21558115. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825 (2000). 
 76. See Cannon, supra note 69, at 1390-91. Babbitt stated: “When I got to town, what 
I didn’t know was that we didn’t need more legislation . . . . We’ve switched the rules of the 
game. We’re not trying to do anything legislatively.” Id. at 1391. 
 77. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4100.0-4170.2 (1995). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. 
 80. 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0–5 (1995). 
 81. Id. 
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grazing privileges.”82 In other words, the Secretary removed from 
the regulations any reference to the adjudicated AUM amounts. 
Instead of determining the AUMs with reference to the grazing 
preference (i.e. the original forage determination eliminated from 
regulatory recognition) and range conditions, the Secretary adopted 
a new approach and a new term—“permitted use.” “Permitted use 
means the forage allocated by, or under the guidance of, an applica-
ble land use plan for livestock grazing in an allotment under a permit 
or lease and is expressed in AUMs.”83 The regulation elaborates that: 
(a) Permitted use is granted to holders of grazing preference and 
shall be specified in all grazing permits and leases. Permitted use 
shall encompass all authorized use including livestock use, any sus-
pended use, and conservation use, except for permits and leases for 
designated ephemeral rangelands where livestock use is authorized 
based upon forage availability, or designated annual rangelands. 
Permitted livestock use shall be based upon the amount of forage 
available for livestock grazing as established in the land use plan, 
activity plan, or decision of the authorized officer under § 4110.3–
3, except, in the case of designated ephemeral or annual  
rangelands, a land use plan or activity plan may alternatively pre-
scribe vegetation standards to be met in the use of such range-
lands.84 
The “permitted use” regulation differs from the previous regula-
tion in that the AUMs specified in the grazing privilege now vary 
depending on the forage amount available for livestock grazing, 
whereas previously the AUMs in the grazing privilege (i.e. the “graz-
ing preference”) remained constant although the “active use” num-
bers varied depending on the forage available.85 Furthermore, under 
the “permitted use” regulation, the Secretary has the sole discretion 
within the land use planning process to determine the maximum 
number of AUMs available to a permit holder without any reference 
to the amount of forage “necessary to permit the proper use of the 
 
 82. Administration of Livestock Grazing on Public Rangelands, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 
9921 (1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4). 
 83. 43 C.F.R § 4100.0–5. 
 84. Id. § 4110.2–2. 
 85. It should be noted that the permitted use definition is not merely a reincarnation of 
“active use” under the pre-1995 regulations because permitted use includes suspended use and 
conservation use. See 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2–2 (2000). Unlike active use under the pre-1995 
regulations, permitted use does not show the actual number of animals that a rancher can 
graze. 
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lands, water or water rights owned occupied, or leased”86 by the 
rancher and to the adjudication process that determined that figure. 
III. PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL V. BABBITT87 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
On July 27, 1995, the Public Lands Council, National Cattle-
man’s Association, American Sheep Industry Association, American 
Farm Bureau Federation, and Association of National Grasslands 
(collectively “PLC”) filed a complaint in the district court in Wyo-
ming against Interior Secretary Babbitt and the BLM (collectively 
“the Secretary”). The complaint challenged the Secretary’s authority 
to eliminate the “grazing preference” and substitute “permitted 
use.” In addition, PLC challenged the Secretary’s authority to im-
plement nine other 1995 regulations.88 The district court invalidated 
four regulations, including the regulation that replaced the term 
“grazing preference” with the term “permitted used.”89 District 
Judge Brimmer concluded that “‘permitted use’ does not enjoy the 
same protection that an adjudicated ‘grazing preference’ [en-
joys]. . . . The Secretary’s substitution of a right of renewal provides 
 
 86. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1994). 
 87. ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 1815 (2000). 
 88. Specifically, PLC sought reversal of the parts of the regulations that (1) eliminated 
the grazing preference; (2) broadly defined the term affiliate; (3) gave title to future structural 
range improvements to the government; (4) allowed for the issuance of conservation use per-
mits; (5) imposed a three-year time limit on temporary use permits; (6) removed the require-
ment that the holder of a grazing permit must be “engaged in the livestock business;” (7) pro-
vided that permittees did not have an exclusive right to use water diversions; (8) allowed for 
the suspension of a grazing permit if the lessee is convicted of violating certain environmental 
laws; (9) imposed a surcharge on a permittee that allows livestock that are not his to graze on 
his permitted area; and (10) adopted management standards called the Fundamentals of 
Rangeland Health. See generally Public Lands Council v. United States Dep’t of the Interior 
Secretary, 929 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Wyo. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 
154 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir.), aff’d on reh’g, 167 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1998), aff’d ___ U.S. 
___, 120 S. Ct. 1815 (2000). 
 89. See id. at 1450-51. 
The Court finds that the following portions of the 1995 regulations are unlawful 
and violate the Taylor Grazing Act: (1) the elimination of the grazing preference 
and replacement with the term “permitted use”; (2) the regulations providing that 
the United States shall have full title to all future range improvements; (3) the regu-
lations providing for conservation use permits; and (4) the regulations reducing the 
mandatory qualifications for a grazing permit. 
Id. 
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less protection and violates the Taylor Grazing Act because it fails to 
adequately safeguard the recognized grazing preferences.”90 
In a two to one opinion, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s holding that the permitted use rule exceeded the Secretary’s 
authority.91 The majority concluded that the TGA allowed the Secre-
tary to replace “grazing preferences” with “permitted use” because 
permitted use would still allow current permit holders preference 
over other ranchers when renewing the permit.92 The majority fur-
ther held that the permitted use rule was within the Secretary’s 
power under FLPMA because the permitted use rule is consistent 
with a FLPMA provision that allows the Secretary to “reexamine the 
condition of the range at any time.”93 Finally, the majority reasoned 
that, because the permitted use rule provides the same procedural 
safeguards as the appeals process under the grazing preference rule 
and the Secretary could choose to administer the permitted use rule 
much the same as he did the grazing preference, the permitted use 
rule was consistent the TGA’s mandate to “adequately safeguard” 
grazing privileges. 94 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari95 and, on May 15, 2000, 
in a 9-0 decision, held that the permitted use rule was a permissible 
exercise of the Secretary’s authority.96 The majority opinion was writ-
ten by Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and 
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas noted in a concurring opinion 
 
 90. Public Lands Council, 929 F. Supp. at 1441. 
 91. See Public Lands Council, 154 F.3d at 1162-63. In addition, the Tenth Circuit rein-
stated the regulations that gave title to future range improvements to the United States and 
eliminated the requirement that a person must be “engaged in the livestock business” in order 
to hold a grazing permit. Public Lands Council, 167 F.3d at 1309. The Tenth Circuit did, 
however, affirm the district court’s holding that invalidated the regulation allowing grazing 
permits to be issued for conservation use. Id. The court of appeals granted the Secretary’s peti-
tion for rehearing and made a minor amendment to its opinion. See id. at 1289. In an unre-
ported opinion, the court of appeals denied PLC’s petition for rehearing. See Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 1, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, (filed June 9, 1999) (No. 98-1991). With 
a vote of 5-5, the Tenth Circuit also denied PLC’s petition for rehearing en banc. Id. 
 92. See Public Lands Council, 154 F.3d at 1298-1303. 
 93.  43 U.S.C. § 1752(e) (1994); see Public Lands Council, 167 F.3d at 1299. 
 94.  See id. at 1301-02. 
 95. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 320 (1999) (granting 
cert.). 
  96. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 1815 (2000). The Su-
preme Court also upheld the Tenth Circuit’s decision that it was within the Secretary’s power 
to vest title to future range improvements in the United States and remove the requirement 
that a grazing permit holder be engaged in the livestock business. See id. at 1825-28. 
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that the Court’s decision was a response to facial challenge and that 
ranchers could still potentially challenge the way the regulations are 
implemented. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning 
The Supreme Court held that the permitted use rule was an al-
lowable use of the Secretary’s power for three reasons. First, the 
Court held that the TGA does not require that the grazing privilege 
be safeguarded in this instance. Second, the Court reasoned that 
even under the pre-1995 regulations, the grazing privileges were not 
secure. Finally, the Court concluded that the 1995 regulations did 
not necessarily diminish the security of grazing privileges. 
1. The Taylor Grazing Act 
The Supreme Court found that the permitted use rule was con-
sistent with the TGA. It reasoned that a complete reading of the text 
of the TGA did not require that the grazing preference be safe-
guarded. It cited the language in the TGA that provides: 
So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions of this subchapter, 
grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be ade-
quately safeguarded, but the creation of a grazing district or the is-
suance of a permit pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter 
shall not create any right, title, interest or estate in or to the lands.97 
The Court first pointed out that the Congress had several pur-
poses in mind when enacting the TGA. It reasoned that because 
Congress wanted to “stop injury to” and “provide for th[e] orderly 
use, improvement, and development” of public grazing land in addi-
tion to “stabilizing the livestock industry,” the Secretary was free to 
determine “how, and the extent to which ‘grazing privileges’ shall be 
safeguarded.”98 
The Court also emphasized the fact that the TGA did not create 
“any right, title, interest or estate in or to the lands.”99 If the ranch-
ers did not have a title to the land, the Court reasoned, the “ranch-
ers’ interest in permit stability cannot be absolute.”100 Because the 
 
 97. Id. at 1823 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315(b)) (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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Court concluded that the ranchers’ interest was not absolute, the 
Court allowed the Secretary considerable leeway in promulgating 
grazing regulation. 
2. Security under the pre-1995 regulations 
Following the idea that the TGA did not require that grazing 
privileges be stable, the Court noted that grazing privileges have 
never been absolutely safeguarded even under the pre-1995 regula-
tions.101 Under the Range Code, the Secretary retained the power to 
reduce grazing numbers if a rancher violated the terms of his permit. 
The TGA and FLPMA authorize the Secretary to reclassify public 
land to make it unavailable for grazing. Finally, under FLPMA, the 
Secretary has the power to formulate land use plans for administra-
tion of public land. The Court concluded that “[g]iven these well-
established pre-1995 Secretarial powers to cancel, modify, or decline 
to review individual permits, including the power to do so pursuant 
to the adoption of a land use plan, the rancher’s diminishment-of-
security point is at best a matter of degree.”102 
3. Facial challenge 
The Court concluded by noting that Public Lands Council was a 
facial challenge to the 1995 regulations. The Court cited the Secre-
tary’s argument that the 1995 regulations were only clarifications of 
existing policy and noted that the 1995 regulations are more rancher 
friendly than regulations originally proposed by the Secretary. The 
Court then criticized the Public Lands Council and the Farm Credit 
Institutions for failure to thoroughly explain how ranchers will be 
hurt by the new regulations. Because the case was decided on a facial 
challenge, “affected permit holder[s] remain[] free to challenge . . . 
an individual effect on grazing privileges.”103 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The issue in Public Lands Council was whether the permitted use 
rule is consistent with relevant statutory provisions and congressional 
intent or whether the Secretary failed to “adequately safeguard” 
 
 101. Id. at 1824. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1825. 
AND-FIN.DOC 10/12/00  2:23 PM 
1273] Public Lands Council v. Babbitt 
 1289 
grazing privileges as required by the TGA. This Note concludes that 
the permitted use rule does not adequately safeguard grazing privi-
leges or stabilize the livestock industry. 
A. Adequate Safeguards 
The TGA requires that “[s]o far as consistent with the purposes 
and provisions of this subchapter, grazing privileges recognized and 
acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded.”104 
1. The grazing privilege 
Whether grazing privileges have been adequately safeguarded 
turns in large part on what a recognized and acknowledged grazing 
privilege is.105 The TGA did not define grazing privileges, but it did 
authorize the Secretary to “issue permits to graze livestock on . . . 
grazing districts.”106 A grazing permit granted the holder the privi-
lege to use forage on the public land. However, the fact that the 
TGA did not mandate safeguarding grazing permits leads to the con-
clusion that a grazing privilege is something distinct from a grazing 
permit. This distinction is understood by focusing on the words 
“grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately 
safeguarded.”107 
 
 
 
 104. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1994) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the “purposes” of 
the TGA, see infra Part IV.B.1. 
 105. There has been much debate over whether ranchers grazing on public lands have a 
grazing privilege or a vested property right. See generally Frank J. Falen & Karen Budd-Falen, 
The Right to Graze Livestock on the Federal Lands: The Historical Development of Western Graz-
ing Rights, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 505 (1993–94). That is not the issue in this case. The grazing 
privilege does not have to be a property right in order for it to be protected. It should make no 
difference whether the grazing preference is viewed as a right or a privilege. See Red Canyon 
Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938), stating: 
We recognize that the rights under the Taylor Grazing Act do not fall within the 
conventional category of vested rights in property. Yet, whether they be called 
rights, privileges, or bare licenses, or by whatever name, while they exist they are 
something of real value to the possessors and something which have their source in 
an enactment of the Congress. 
Id. at 315. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (“[T]he court has 
fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges’ that once 
seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.”). 
 106. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b). 
 107. Id. (emphasis added). 
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While the TGA did not provide the method for recognizing 
grazing privileges, it did give some guidance in determining which 
ranchers should receive grazing permits. It mandated that 
preference shall be given in the issuance of grazing permits to 
those . . . who are landowners engaged in the livestock business, 
bona fide occupants or settlers, or owners of water or water rights, 
as may be necessary to permit the proper use of lands, water or wa-
ter rights owned, occupied, or leased by them.108 
Thus, the TGA provided that private landowners would be given 
sufficient grazing permits to allow them to make proper use of their 
private land before itinerant grazers and others were given grazing 
permits. 
It was the adjudication process that initially determined the allo-
cation of forage under the TGA.109 As mandated by the TGA, adju-
dication first determined the number of AUMs that landowners 
needed to make proper use of their private property and then allo-
cated AUMs to other applicants. The adjudicated AUM amount rep-
resented the maximum amount of forage available, given ideal range 
conditions.110 This adjudication of AUMs available was the process 
that “recognized and acknowledged” the privilege to graze.111 After 
the AUMs had been adjudicated, the rancher was entitled to a graz-
ing permit.112 Because the adjudication of forage was the process that 
“recognized and acknowledged” ranchers’ grazing privileges, the 
language of the TGA requires that the AUMs adjudicated, i.e. the 
grazing preference,113 be adequately safeguarded. Whether this origi-
 
 108. Id. 
 109. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. 
 110. See 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2–2 (1994). 
 111. The Tenth Circuit majority criticized Judge Tacha’s dissent for “[w]ithout citation 
to any authority” describing “at length a process whereby the Secretary made permit renewal 
decisions by ‘reference to’ or in ‘recognition of’ the original grazing adjudication.” Public 
Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1297 (10th Cir.), aff’d, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 
1815 (2000). The Tenth Circuit majority then concluded, without citation to any authority, 
that “[t]o the extent the original adjudications affected the substance of future grazing per-
mits, they were not ‘recognized’ in the manner asserted by the dissent under any regulations 
promulgated since the enactment of FLPMA.” Id. at 1298. 
 112. See VOIGT, supra note 35, at 263. Even the Tenth Circuit found that “[o]nce the 
Secretary issued a favorable grazing decision regarding an individual applicant, the applicant 
received a ten-year permit which specified the maximum number of livestock, measured in 
AUMs, that the permittee was entitled to place in a grazing district.” Public Lands Council, 
167 F.3d at 1295. 
 113. See 43 C.F.R § 4110.2–2 (1978). 
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nal AUM adjudication is called a “grazing preference” or the “rec-
ognized and acknowledged” grazing privilege, or some other name, 
the basic point is that the forage that the rancher needed to make 
proper use of his private land was to be safeguarded. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion did not discuss how the adjudica-
tion process recognized and acknowledged grazing privileges; it 
merely noted that ranchers with base property should be allowed to 
graze on public land first and then stated that “grazing allocations 
were determined.”114 The Court instead focused on the fact that the 
Secretary has always had power to modify permits and reduce graz-
ing numbers depending on the condition of the range.115 Because 
the Secretary has always had this power, the Court concluded that 
the Secretary should be given considerable deference in promulgat-
ing the new regulations.116 But the Court should not have given def-
erence to the Secretary’s construction when “the legislative history of 
the enactment shows with sufficient clarity that [it] is contrary to the 
will of Congress.”117 The TGA’s legislative history shows that Con-
gress intended forage available for grazing to remain constant.118 
 
 114. Public Lands Council, 120 S. Ct. at 1820. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1824. 
 117. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 233 (1986) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 118. The Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the fact that the TGA did not create 
“any right, title, interest or estate in or to the lands.” Public Lands Council, 120 S. Ct. at 
1823. The Secretary made a similar argument in his brief to the Supreme Court. The Secretary 
argued that Congress did not intend to allow for a constant amount of forage available because 
an early version of the house resolution that became the TGA provided that “grazing rights 
recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and decisions of the court” would be 
“adequately safeguarded,” but, prior to passage, “grazing rights” was changed to “grazing 
privileges” and “local customs, laws, and decision of the courts” was eliminated. Respondent’s 
Brief at 32, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 1815 (filed Jan. 10, 
2000) (No. 98-1991). While this amendment illustrated Congress’ hesitation to create a prop-
erty right, it does not mean that Congress wanted forage availability to fluctuate. Congress was 
reluctant to recognize a property right because it did not want to stir up litigation similar to 
that caused by the creation of the Forest Service’s grazing program. 
The Forest Service, from the beginning of their grazing program, had granted some 
grazing permits to parties with no prior rights. These permittees often competed to 
the detriment of the permittees with prior rights or preference. They had sometimes 
attempted to establish rights by use on the water and range of the preference per-
mittee. Expensive and bitter litigation had often resulted. 
HAGE, supra note 15, at 183. Looking at other portions of the legislative history shows that, 
while Congress did not want to create a right, they did intend for forage availability to remain 
constant. See infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text. 
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Congress wanted to provide ranchers with “some assurance as to 
where and what kind of range they may have and depend upon for 
their stock, what they can definitely rely upon in the way of pastur-
age.”119 It wanted to give “stockmen whose operations are depend-
ent upon grazing . . . assured grazing privileges, on the basis of 
which [they could make] definite plans.”120 As then Interior Secre-
tary Harold L. Ickes summarized, the TGA provided “those engaged 
in the livestock industry” with “certainty of tenure in their grazing 
use of the public lands.”121 
2. Facial challenge 
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that “the new defini-
tional regulations by themselves do not automatically bring about a 
self-executing change that would significantly diminish the security 
of granted grazing privileges.”122 This conclusion was based on the 
premise that the Secretary could choose to administer the permitted 
use rule the same way he administered the grazing preference rule.123 
If this were the case, then the Court believed that the grazing privi-
lege would be adequately safeguarded.124 The Supreme Court sug-
gested that the ranchers should wait until they are actually harmed 
and then bring action individually.125 As Justice O’Connor explained 
in her concurrence: “Petitioners have not shown how the new regu-
lations themselves—rather than specific actions the Secretary might 
take pursuant to those regulations—violate the Taylor Grazing Act’s 
requirement that ‘grazing privileges recognized and acknowl-
edged . . . be adequately safeguarded.’”126 
 
 
 119. 78 CONG. REC. 5371 (1934). 
 120. H.R. REP. No. 73-903 at 2 (1934). 
 121. Id. at 7. Congress wanted grazing preferences to remain constant so that ranchers 
would be able to use their grazing permits to secure loans. See infra notes 162-165 and ac-
companying text. 
 122. Public Lands Council, 120 S. Ct. at 1824. 
 123. To succeed on a facial challenge of an administrative agency regulation, a plaintiff 
must show “‘that no set of circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be valid.’” 
Public Lands Council v. Babbitt 167 F.3d 1287, 1293 (1998), aff’d 120 S. Ct. 1815 (2000) 
(quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739 (1987) (alternation in original))). 
 124. Public Lands Council, 120 S. Ct. at 1825. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1828. 
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The Court’s conclusion that the ranchers did not show that the 
regulations themselves would harm the ranchers is based on the 
faulty reasoning that the TGA does not require that adjudicated for-
age levels be adequately safeguarded. If the adjudicated forage levels 
must be recognized, then, as Judge Tacha’s dissent to the Tenth 
Circuit opinion concluded, it is irrelevant that “permittees will not 
immediately lose their right to graze on the public lands.”127 Judge 
Tacha continued: 
When the Secretary undertook to allocate privileges to various ap-
plicants to graze a particular allotment on [sic] the public range, he 
made a series of determinations . . . . Then, he awarded a successful 
applicant a grazing preference to graze up to a certain amount of 
forage, not just for the life of the permit, but for as long as the Sec-
retary allowed the permittee to graze on the public lands.128 
There is no possible way that the Secretary could administer the 
permitted use rule and still preserve the adjudicated grazing prefer-
ence. The initial adjudication determined the AUMs that the rancher 
required in order to make proper use of his private land. Under the 
permitted use rule, the AUMs are determined through land use 
planning.129 Neither FLPMA nor the Secretary’s regulations allow 
the Secretary to consider the AUMs that the rancher needs to make 
proper use of his private land. Furthermore, there is no way for per-
mitted use under a land use plan to recognize the AUM levels set by 
the adjudication process. Simply put, either the maximum forage 
available is determined by the adjudicated level, or it is determined 
by land use planning, but it cannot be determined by both. 
 
 127. Public Lands Council, 167 F.3d at 1315-16 (Tacha, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. 
 129. A land use plan is “developed through public participation in accordance with the 
provisions of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.” 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0–5 
(1995). FLPMA requires that 
public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, sce-
nic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and 
archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public 
lands in their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and wild-
life and domestic animals; and that will provide for outdoor recreation and human 
occupancy and use. 
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8). FLPMA also requires that land use planning will be “on the basis of 
multiple use and sustained yield.” Id. § 1701(a)(7). 
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B. Stabilizing the Livestock Industry 
1. The purpose of the TGA 
The preamble of the TGA states that it was enacted “[t]o stop 
injury to the public grazing lands by preventing overgrazing and soil 
deterioration, to provide for their orderly use, improvement and de-
velopment, to stabilize the livestock industry dependent upon the public 
range, and for other purposes.”130 The TGA also provides that the 
purpose of grazing districts is to “regulate [range] occupancy and 
use, to preserve the land and its resources from destruction or un-
necessary injury, [and] to provide for the orderly use, improvement, 
and development of the range.”131 
The Supreme Court used this language to conclude that permit 
stability is not absolute.132 The Court suggests that because the TGA 
had numerous purposes, the Secretary is now allowed almost limit-
less authority to decide how Congress intended these purposes to in-
teract with one another. However, the legislative history and histori-
cal context show that the 1934 Congress never intended that the 
Secretary be allowed to drive ranchers out of business under the aus-
pices of improving range conditions. In considering the purpose of 
enacted legislation, a court “may with propriety recur to the history 
of the times when it was passed; and this is frequently necessary, in 
order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular pro-
visions in it.”133 According to a House committee, “the whole pur-
pose of the [TGA] is to conserve the public range in aid of the live-
stock industry.”134 The TGA was a “[d]epression measure to avert 
the imminent collapse of both the range and the associated livestock 
industry.”135 Congressman Edward T. Taylor of Colorado, who rep-
 
 130. Taylor Grazing Act Preamble, ch. 865, 43 Stat. 1269 (1934) (uncodified) (emphasis 
added); 78 CONG. REC. 5371 (1934). “While it is true that the title is only a formal part of an 
act, the United States Supreme Court . . . reaffirmed the principle that resort may be had to 
the title as an aid to the construction of the act.” The Nature and Extent of the Department’s 
Authority to Issue Grazing Privileges Under the Taylor Grazing Act, 56 Interior Dec. 62, 66 
(1937) (citation omitted). 
 131. 43 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994). 
 132. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
 133. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669 (1979) (quoting United States 
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875)). 
 134. H.R. REP. No. 73-903, at 2 (1934). 
 135. George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management V: Prescrip-
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resented a large constituency of ranchers, sponsored the TGA.136 
Ranchers, hearing about the success of the Mizpah–Pumpkin Creek 
grazing district, also supported the TGA.137 It is unlikely that Con-
gressman Taylor and these ranchers supported the TGA primarily as 
a conservation measure and were only secondarily concerned with 
their livelihood. As Secretary Ickes summarized, “[w]e wanted to 
protect the range in the interest of the stock industry.”138 
Similarly, courts have concluded that stabilizing the livestock in-
dustry was one of the principal purposes of the TGA. For example, in 
Faulkner v. Watt,139 the Ninth Circuit observed that “[t]he purpose 
of the Taylor Grazing Act is to stabilize the livestock industry and 
protect the rights of sheep and cattle growers from interference.”140 
The Tenth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Chournos v. 
United States,141 stating, “[t]he purpose of the Taylor Grazing Act is 
to stabilize the livestock industry and to permit the use of the public 
range according to the needs and the qualifications of the livestock 
operators with base holdings.”142 
While both FLPMA and PRIA were partly products of growing 
concern for the environment, neither statute repealed the TGA. As 
FLPMA states, “[n]othing in this Act shall be deemed to repeal any 
existing law by implication.”143 The regulations promulgated in fur-
therance of FLPMA and PRIA also show the intention not to disturb 
privileges recognized by the TGA. The preamble to the 1978 
 
tions for Reform, 14 ENVTL. L. 497, 503 (1984) (footnote omitted); see also supra Part II.A. 
 136. See HAGE, supra note 15, at 182. 
Congressman Edward T. Taylor of Colorado[, the sponsor of the TGA,] had a 
background close to the livestock industry. He had been a major opponent of the 
forest reserves and a strong proponent of privatization. Faced with the reality of 
northern core resistance to any action that would expose the questionable legality of 
the forest reserves, Taylor opted for what he thought would be a bill adequately 
protecting the rancher’s property rights. 
Id. 
 137. See PEFFER, supra note 27, at 215. 
 138. To Provide for the Orderly Use, Improvement, and Dev. of the Pub. Range, Hearings 
on H.R. 2835 and H.R. 6462 before the House Comm. on the Pub. Lands, 73d Cong., 1st & 2d 
Sess. 133 (1933 & 1934). 
 139. 661 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 140. Id. at 812 (citations omitted). 
 141. 193 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1951). 
 142. Id. at 323; see also Oman v. United States, 195 F.2d 710, 711 (10th Cir. 1952) 
(“[T]he purpose of the Taylor Grazing Act [is] to stabilize the livestock industry . . . .”). 
 143. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 274 
(1976) (uncodified portion). 
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amendments to the Federal Range Code states that “[s]erious con-
cern was expressed in several of the comments about how these graz-
ing regulations will affect the livestock operators now authorized to 
graze on the public lands” but reassured ranchers that “[t]here [sic] 
adjudicated grazing use, their base properties and their areas of use 
(allotments) [would] be recognized under [the 1978] regula-
tions.”144 Because neither FLPMA nor PRIA changed the TGA’s re-
quirement to safeguard the livestock industry, the Secretary still has a 
congressional mandate to safeguard the industry so long as he can do 
so while satisfying the requirements of FLPMA and PRIA. The Sec-
retary can stabilize the livestock industry while complying with 
FLPMA and PRIA, as evidenced by the pre-1995 regulations.145 
2. The lack of stability under the permitted use rule 
The livestock industry depends on the availability of forage on 
federal rangeland.146 While the permitted use rule does not require 
the immediate removal of all livestock from public land, it does leave 
the certainty of the availability of federal forage in question. Because 
the livestock industry is so dependent on the federal rangeland, the 
possibility that forage may not be available in the future is sufficient 
to destabilize the livestock industry. The instability is caused because 
neither ranchers nor those who lend to ranchers will be able to pre-
dict with certainty whether sufficient federal range will be available in 
the future. The Supreme Court dismisses the loss of stability as mi-
nor because the “diminishment-of-security point is at best a matter 
 
 144. Range Code of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 29,058 (1978). 
 145. The Secretary is not arguing that the permitted use rule is necessary to comply with 
FLPMA and PRIA. FLPMA and PRIA both provide for a variety of activities on public land. 
See supra Parts II.B–II.C. The underlying rationale for the rule appears to have been a concern 
for the environment. Environmental concerns should be addressed in a way that will not desta-
bilize the livestock industry. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. Furthermore, it is not 
clear that the permitted use rule will improve the environment. The TGA sought to improve 
range conditions by eliminating the grazing “commons” and creating stability in the ranching 
industry. By giving use of a portion of the range to only one rancher and assuring that rancher 
that he would be able to use the range in the future, that rancher had an incentive to preserve 
the environmental condition of the range because he would not be able to spread future losses 
associated with over-grazing among other ranchers. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
The permitted use rule provides exactly the opposite incentive. By making grazing privileges 
less stable and less certain, the Secretary gives ranchers less incentive to maintain the environ-
ment because the ranchers cannot be certain that they will be able to realize future benefits 
associated with using environmentally sound grazing practices today. 
 146. See Wolfson, supra note 1. 
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of degree.”147 The Court also seems to question whether there will 
be any loss in stability because the Farm Credit Institutions’ amicus 
brief did not explain why they would change their lending policies 
towards ranchers. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not 
understand what Congress has understood for almost seventy years. 
Congress understood that for the livestock industry to be stable 
the adjudicated preference would have to remain constant so that 
ranchers could use their grazing permits as collateral. As one Senator 
noted, part of the reason ranchers needed the TGA was that the un-
certainty created by a grazing commons left the rancher “lacking the 
assurance of feed for his animals,” therefore making it “more difficult 
to procure necessary loans.”148 Congressman Taylor knew that the 
grazing privilege needed to be “definite and sufficient.”149 
Otherwise, there would be no permanence to the business. People 
who have herds would not be safe; they would have no credit with 
the banks for securing money. They cannot secure money from the 
banks if they cannot show that they have some definite and suffi-
cient place on the range where their stock may be adequately 
grazed.150 
Even the language of the TGA recognizes that grazing permits 
would be used as collateral.151 
Congress still understands and values the stability of the livestock 
industry. As recently as 1993, Congress considered the issue of graz-
ing reform. Senator Reid from Nevada, who sponsored the reform 
legislation, did not include changes to the grazing preference be-
cause “eliminating th[e] preference would devaluate the permit in 
the eyes of lending institutions.”152 
 
 
 
 147. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 1815, 1824 (2000). 
 148. 78 CONG. REC. 11,140 (1934) (statement of Sen. Adams). 
 149. 78 CONG. REC. 5371 (1934). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1994). 
[N]o permittee complying with the rules and regulations laid down by the Secretary 
of the Interior shall be denied the renewal of such permit, if such denial will impair 
the value of the grazing unit of the permittee, when such unit is pledged as security 
for any bona fide loan. 
Id. 
 152. 139 CONG. REC. 14,087 (1993). 
AND-FIN.DOC 10/12/00  2:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1298 
The livestock industry, like most commercial industries, requires 
credit to operate.153 Ranchers typically engage in two types of bor-
rowing. First, many ranchers borrow a large sum initially to purchase 
the private land that is the base ranch for the grazing operation. Sec-
ond, because income from ranching is cyclical, ranchers use a line of 
credit or short-term loans to meet operating costs. Both of these 
types of loans are often secured by grazing permits.154 
Lenders have been willing to accept grazing permits as collateral 
in part because the AUMs in the grazing preference remain the same 
from year to year. When there is uncertainty in whether forage on 
federal rangeland will be available in the future, lenders are less will-
ing to use the permits as collateral. 
One question always in lenders’ minds as they decide the amount 
of money to lend on a given amount of collateral is: “What will I 
have if I repossess the collateral upon default?” Under the grazing 
preference system prior to 1995, lenders knew that they would get 
the AUMs specified in the grazing preference and that the AUM 
would be divided between active use and suspended use permits. 
Lenders also knew that some of the AUMs were in suspended use 
because of poor grazing practices, harsh weather conditions, or natu-
ral disasters. If poor grazing practices had resulted in reduced AUMs, 
then lenders could still get the value of the loan secured by the col-
lateral by selling the permit to someone else who, through better 
ranching practices, could convert the suspended use permits to active 
use permits up to the amount of the grazing preference. Similarly, if 
weather conditions or natural disasters were the cause of the sus-
pended use permits, the lender could be reasonably certain that the 
immediate emergency would pass and that the active level of permits 
could eventually be restored to the historical level determined by the 
grazing preference.155 
 
 
 
 153. See Mark Taugher, Suit Over Grazing Permits Worries Ranchers, ALBUQUERQUE J., 
June 4, 1999, at A1 (“For . . . public lands ranchers, access to credit sometimes a lot of credit 
[sic] is a necessity.”). 
 154. See Falen & Bud-Falen, supra note 105, at 523 n.103 (“Agricultural lenders, includ-
ing banks backed by the Federal government, loan money on grazing preferences. The liens 
against such preference are attached to the grazing permit in . . . BLM files.”). 
 155. Cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Farm Credit Institutions in support of Petitioners, Public 
Lands Council v. Babbitt (filed Dec. 3, 1999) (No. 98-1991). 
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Under the permitted use rule, the answer to the lenders’ ques-
tion, “What will I have?” is less clear. The historical level is no longer 
recognized or safeguarded. Instead, under the permitted use rule, 
permits indicate the current amount of AUMs that the rancher is al-
lowed to graze at a particular moment in time. This level of AUMs 
may or may not be the same when the bank takes the grazing per-
mits. The president of one community bank explained, “[t]he value 
of a permit has fallen as a result of these changes in rangeland regula-
tions and uncertainties about the future.”156 Hence, lenders have rea-
son to approach loans secured by grazing permits with greater cau-
tion. 
“The issue of collateral is one of great economic importance. 
When borrowers cannot use their assets as collateral for loans [or 
when the value of the collateral is significantly less than its historical 
value] interest rates on loans tend to be higher to reflect the risk to 
lenders.”157 If grazing permits are not stable enough to be used for 
collateral, ranchers will be unable to get new loans. Even assuming 
that some lenders will still be willing to lend on grazing permits, the 
interest rates on these loans will be higher to reflect a greater risk to 
the lender. Consequently, ranchers will be constrained, not only by 
the willingness of lenders to provide loans, but also by their own 
ability to pay higher interest rates. 
Beyond the issue of collateral, the devaluation of the grazing 
permit caused by the uncertainty of forage availability under the 
permitted use rule could affect the amount that a rancher is able to 
borrow. “Whether a rancher’s grazing permits are formally put up as 
collateral or merely included in a banker’s cold-eyed calculation of a 
rancher’s financial health, they are necessary to ensure the fiscal sta-
bility of Western cattle interests, which has long been a stated goal of 
government officials.”158 
Even ranchers grazing on private land would be destabilized by 
the public-land ranchers’ inability to borrow. If ranchers are unable 
to maintain sufficient cash flow to finance their obligations, they will 
 
 156. Doug McInnis, A Change of Heart, BEEF, Feb. 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL 
28549143 (quoting John Hay III, president of Rock Springs National Bank in Rock Springs, 
Wyoming). 
 157. Heywood Fleisig, Secured Transactions: The Power of Collateral, FIN. & DEV., June 
1996, at 44. 
 158. Jim Nesbitt, Environmentalists Battle with Ranchers, Bankers; Loans Tied to Grazing 
are Blasted, NEW ORLEANS TIMES—PICAYUNE, Nov. 5, 1995, at A16. 
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be forced to liquidate their herds. Increased liquidation of livestock 
would cause the market price for livestock to drop.159 Ranchers who 
graze livestock on private land and feedlot operators would face 
these lower prices when taking their livestock to market. Thus, even 
the ranchers not using public land would face lower rates of return. 
Because, “[o]n average, ranchers make only a two percent return on 
their operations,”160 price fluctuations are particularly hazardous to 
the livestock industry. 
Ranchers would not be the only ones hurt by devaluation of the 
grazing permit. Lenders that have already made loans secured by 
grazing permits would be injured if the value of the grazing permits 
fell below the outstanding loan balance.161 While the purpose of the 
TGA and other grazing legislation was not to protect lenders, Con-
gress did not want lenders holding grazing permits to be subjected 
to unnecessary risk. 162 This is evidenced by the TGA’s statement that 
no permittee complying with the rules and regulations laid down 
by the Secretary of the Interior shall be denied the renewal of such 
permit, if such denial will impair the value of the grazing unit of 
the permittee, when such unit is pledged as security for any bona 
fide loan.163 
Secretary Babbitt said that change from grazing privileges to 
permitted use is inconsequential because, “[i]n the absence of a ma-
jor change in the overall situation and where [land use plan] objec-
tives are being met, changes in permitted use through BLM initiative  
 
 
 159. See Perri Knize, Winning the War for the West, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1999, at 
54. 
 160. Id. at 55. 
 161. See Taugher, supra note 153. This fact has not been lost on farm credit lenders. 
They have filed an amicus brief in this case. See Brief of Amici Curiae Farm Credit Institutions 
in support of Petitioners, Public Lands Council v. Babbitt (filed Dec. 3, 1999) (No. 98-1991). 
 162. Congress has directed lenders to engage in lending to the ranching industry. Lend-
ers in the Farm Credit System (an independent agency of the federal government) are required 
to “improv[e] the income and well-being of . . . ranchers by furnishing sound, adequate, and 
constructive credit.” 12 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (1994). Privately owned community banks “have [a] 
continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in 
which they are chartered.” Id. § 2901. For banks in rural communities where ranching plays a 
significant economic role, this includes lending to ranchers. It is unfair to penalize lenders who 
have lent to ranchers in compliance with these congressional mandates by reducing the value of 
the assets held as security. 
 163. 43 U.S.C § 315(b) (1994). 
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are unlikely. This provides a high level of security, stability and  
predictability from year to year.”164 The Secretary continues: 
Permitted use is not subject to yearly change. Permitted use will be 
established through the land use planning process, a process which 
requires data collection and detailed analysis, the completion of ap-
propriate NEPA documentation, and multiple opportunities for 
public input. Establishing permitted use through this planning 
process will increase, not decrease, the stability of grazing opera-
tions.165 
The Secretary contends that “[t]he change is merely a clarifica-
tion of terminology.”166 If, however, the change were simply seman-
tic, why would Secretary Babbitt go to the trouble of changing from 
grazing preference to permitted use in the first place? And why has 
the Secretary gone to so much effort to defend the permitted use 
rule in court? Given other Interior regulations and policies imple-
mented during Secretary Babbitt’s tenure, 167 it is likely, regardless of 
what the Secretary says, that the changes are for more than “clarifica-
tion.” 
Even groups opposed to grazing on public lands have recognized 
that the stability of the ranching industry is dependant upon ranch-
ers’ ability to use grazing permits as collateral. In June 1999, Forest 
Guardians, a conservation group, filed suit seeking to “end the prac-
tice of ranchers using public land grazing permits as collateral for 
bank loans.”168 In discussing the attempt to tighten lending to 
ranchers, Forest Guardians’ John Horning admitted, with an inter-
esting choice of words, “It’s another way to destabilize the livestock in-
dustry, frankly.”169 
Regardless of the Secretary’s motive, the fact remains that the 
Department of the Interior does not lend to ranchers. Although the 
Secretary may intend to provide for stability, it is ultimately the lend-
ers that calculate risk and determine whether to lend to ranchers. 
 
 164. Administration of Livestock Grazing on Public Rangelands, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 
9922-23 (1995) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4). 
 165. Id. at 9928. 
 166. Id. at 9922. 
 167. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text. 
 168. Mike Taugher, Bank Backs Graze-Permit Collateral, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 28, 
1999, at 1. See Forest Guardians v. United States Forest Service, No. CIV-99-615 LCS/KBM 
(D.N.M. filed June 2, 1999). 
 169. Taugher, supra note 153 (emphasis added). 
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Even if the Secretary enforced the permitted use rule in exactly the 
same way as the pre-1995 regulations, ranchers would still suffer the 
effect of uncertainty. The Secretary’s opinion on the stability of graz-
ing permits, especially in the absence of formal regulations requiring 
stability, matters less to ranchers who want to borrow than the opin-
ions of potential lenders. 
This is not to suggest that the stability of the livestock industry 
must be pursued with complete disregard to the condition of the 
rangeland. It is true that both interests must be balanced, but they 
must be balanced in such a manner as to allow stability in the live-
stock industry while maintaining an acceptable quality of rangeland. 
There are numerous ways that the Secretary could accomplish this 
goal.170 Eliminating grazing preferences in favor of permitted use is 
not one of them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court was mistaken in holding that the 1995 regu-
lations were consistent with the TGA for two reasons. First, the TGA 
requires that recognized and acknowledged grazing privileges should 
be safeguarded. The adjudication process recognized and acknowl-
edged the grazing privileges by determining the number of AUMs 
necessary for a landowner to make proper use of his private property. 
The permitted use rule does not safeguard grazing privileges because 
it ignores the prior adjudication and allows the maximum number of 
AUMs to be set by land use plans. Second, a primary purpose of the 
TGA is to stabilize the livestock industry. By changing from a system 
of “grazing preferences” to “permitted use,” the regulations move 
from a regulatory scheme where ranchers and lenders know what to 
expect to a scheme where there can be no reasonable expectations. 
The lack of certainty will destabilize the livestock industry by making 
it difficult for ranchers to get credit. Although some consideration 
must be given to balancing economic interests and environmental  
 
 
 
 
 170. For example, pre-1995 regulations balanced environmental and grazing interests. 
The BLM conceded: “Rangeland conditions have improved on many upland areas since the 
1930s.” BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 
RANGELAND REFORM ‘94 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 73 (1994). 
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concerns, the Secretary, the BLM, and the courts should not have 
ignored Congress’s mandate to stabilize the livestock industry. 
Julie Andersen∗ 
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